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THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH ABROAD
MARTIN S. FLAHERTY*

INTRODUCTION
Let me start by pledging allegiance, at least for the pur‐
poses of this exchange, to several principles of constitutional
interpretation that I suspect command widespread support
among a group of Federalist Society members such as this.
First, I proceed on the premise that the basic interpretive
methodology applied to constitutional foreign affairs ques‐
tions should be the same as to domestic affairs. I therefore
decline the invitation to indulge in what has been termed
“foreign affairs exceptionalism.”1 Second, and perhaps with
greater personal pain, I decline the invitation to indulge in
any number of progressive, avant‐garde, or unconventional
constitutional theories, regardless of what merit they may
otherwise have. Thus, I will not defend my positions based
upon unconventional views about constitutional higher
lawmaking,2 representation reinforcement or other process‐
based theories,3 morally inflected interpretivism,4 or natural

* Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights and Co‐Director,
Crowley Program in International Human Rights, Fordham Law School, New
York City. My thanks to Amber Lewis for valuable research assistance.
1. Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1089, 1096–97 (1999).
2. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (arguing that “We the
People of the United States” adopt higher constitutional law during “constitu‐
tional moments” in a manner that may or may not comport with previously speci‐
fied procedures for higher lawmaking).
3. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (arguing that judicial review is at its most legitimate when it seeks
to correct a breakdown in the democratic process); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (contending that constitutional
interpretation is best left to the legislative process).
4. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (advocating reliance on
moral theory as a means to derive interpretations that best fit and justify our con‐
stitutional commitments); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAIN CLOTHES: A
THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004) (arguing for constitu‐
tional interpretations that reflect fundamental justice).
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law.5 Rather, I proceed based upon good old Federalist Soci‐
ety‐style text, history (in the sense of original understanding
and ongoing custom), and structure.6 However conventional,
this hoary methodology compels only one conclusion: rejection
of even the laudably moderate version of the executive foreign
affairs authority theory espoused by Professor Ramsey.
In Professor Ramsey’s view, the term “executive Power” in
Article II includes at least some residual foreign affairs author‐
ity.7 Therefore, according to Professor Ramsey, the default posi‐
tion under the Constitution is that the text does not allocate a
foreign affairs power within the government, it falls, without
more, to the President.8 Elsewhere, Professor Curtis Bradley
and I have termed this position the “Vesting Clause Thesis,” or
more broadly, “executive essentialism,”9 because it is premised
on the view that a general foreign affairs power is an essential,
inherent component of the “executive Power” and that the Ex‐
ecutive Vesting Clause allocates this subcategory of executive
authority to “a President of the United States of America.”10
Now, there are stronger and softer versions of this view.
Used in the wrong hands—such as those of John Yoo—the
Vesting Clause Thesis, in its most potent form, could be ap‐
plied not just to supplement presidential power in areas in
which there is no clear grant of authority to the other branches,
but as a way to foil attempts by Congress to exercise even
clearly specified authority in “executive foreign affairs” areas.
Accordingly, Professor Yoo has argued that the Executive’s for‐
eign affairs power is not merely residual but, in broadly de‐
fined areas, nothing short of exclusive.11 It therefore follows
that the President’s general executive foreign affairs authority
provides one basis for the Executive to ignore conflicting fed‐
eral statutes—even and including, to take one notorious exam‐

5. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) (espousing
natural law as a basis for interpretation of constitutional rights).
6. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849 (1989).
7. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234–35 (2001).
8. See id.
9. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and For‐
eign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 546, 551–52 (2004).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
11. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
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ple, acts of Congress prohibiting torture12—should the Presi‐
dent deem that mistreatment of detainees might yield valuable
information in the “Global War on Terrorism.”13 Professor
Ramsey does not go that far, and I commend him for that. In‐
deed, his full theory puts forward a robust vision of what legis‐
lative power in the foreign affairs domain is, and further pro‐
vides that Congress should generally prevail when acting in its
domain.14 Indeed, the irony in all of this is that doctrinally, Pro‐
fessor Ramsey and I actually are not that far apart.
Yet, even in its kinder, gentler form, the Vesting Clause The‐
sis cannot and should not pass constitutional muster. As ar‐
gued below, the thesis fails on the grounds that conventional
methods of constitutional interpretation do not sustain it. Or‐
dinarily, that would be reason enough to oppose what would
prove to be a fairly radical constitutional innovation. Executive
power essentialism, however, presents a further set of practical
considerations that counsel its rejection. Simply put, it offers a
simple rhetorical trope so powerful that it can and does fall
into the wrong hands too readily. The Vesting Clause Thesis
creates an asymmetry in constitutional interpretation whereby,
at least in foreign affairs, Congress has to point to specific
powers to justify its exercise of authority while the President
does not. As a practical matter, this asymmetry invites and fa‐
cilitates genuine abuses of executive authority, which already
enjoys a comparative advantage of energy, focus, and informa‐
tion in foreign affairs as it is. The notion of residual executive
foreign affairs authority is at once wrong in law and dangerous
in practice.
Happily, these same factors that counsel against executive
essentialism point to an alternative approach. Call it “interpre‐
tive symmetry.” Unpacked, interpretive symmetry means sim‐
ply that all “political” branches—the President, Congress, and
for that matter, the courts—have to resort to conventional
methods of constitutional interpretation to justify their exercise
of power. In the present discussion, the critical point is that in‐
terpretive symmetry applies as fully in foreign relations law as
it does in its domestic counterpart. This means that with regard
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340−2340B (2006).
13. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐srv/nation/
documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf.
14. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 7, at 235.
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to foreign affairs, the text enunciates but does not exhaust im‐
portant divisions of power. Envision separation of powers,
domestic or foreign, inked in at the top in a non‐comprehensive
fashion. This hardly resolves innumerable, more specific, inter‐
branch turf battles. This brute textual fact in turn means that
many, if not most, constitutional questions in this area will be
left to be resolved by history, in the sense of original under‐
standing, or ongoing custom, the “gloss” on the text that sub‐
sequent practice yields.15 Yet even here, many questions lack
adequate guidance. Ultimately, one may have no choice but to
fall back on structural or purposive approaches. As applied, an
approach based on interpretive symmetry may be neither sim‐
ple nor elegant. Nevertheless, in contrast to executive power
essentialism, it does boast the advantage of legitimacy.
I.
Under conventional, or for that matter many unconventional,
interpretive principles, text remains the starting point for de‐
termining legitimate constitutional meaning. This brings me to
my first objection to the Vesting Clause Thesis: the term “ex‐
ecutive” simply cannot bear the massive weight that Professor
Ramsey would have it bear. For starters, consider Samuel John‐
son’s Dictionary, though this already crosses from textualism to
originalism. In Johnson’s Dictionary, as in modern dictionaries,
“execute” does not refer to a general foreign affairs authority.
Then, as now, “execute” means to implement and render effec‐
tive the laws.16 For this reason alone, it necessarily falls to spe‐
cific constitutional clauses to allocate foreign affairs authority.
As Professor Bradley and I have argued, exactly such reliance
was the dominant approach at the Founding.17
Second, as has often been pointed out, there are counter‐
texts—specific grants of authority in Article II that would make
no sense, or at the very least would be redundant, if the Execu‐
tive Vesting Clause conveys foreign affairs authority en masse.
Why have a Commander‐in‐Chief Clause?18 Why have an

15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frank‐
furter, J., concurring).
16. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. re‐
print 2001) (1755).
17. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 592–687.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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Opinions Clause?19 Why have an Ambassador Receipt
Clause?20 Moreover, why have a Treaty Clause and an Ap‐
pointments Clause written the way they are: in terms of grants
of power to the President, rather than as exceptions to a foreign
affairs authority on behalf of the Senate or Congress?21 So the
answer cannot lie in the text. At best, the text is simply incon‐
clusive.
II.
The answer, therefore, ostensibly comes from history. On the
essentialist view, the eighteenth‐century world understood ex‐
ecutive power to encompass much more than mere law imple‐
mentation. And whatever else counted as part of the “much
more,” the argument continues, foreign affairs authority was
almost universally taken to be a component of executive
power. Is this version of the history correct?
Getting the history right is often an elusive quest, especially
in constitutional controversies that have endured for centuries.
As Justice Jackson famously stated, in the realm of foreign rela‐
tions law no less, often the historical sources are “almost as en‐
igmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for
Pharaoh.”22 But not here. There is very, little evidence to sup‐
port the proposition that eighteenth‐century Americans gener‐
ally—or even occasionally—believed that executive power
equaled foreign affairs power.
Asserting this proposition, however, brings up a problem
about getting history right, which is that it usually entails ex‐
haustive research, exhaustively presented.23 A debate format,
however, is not ideal when questions of law turn on historical
rigor. A few representative sound bytes must suffice.
The first sound byte is a stark fact. Examine the four volumes
of Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention,24 the twenty or so
volumes of the Documentary History of the Ratification of the Con‐

19. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
23. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
24. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966).
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stitution,25 and the debates of the First Congress. Take a step
back and read the texts and interpretations of the sixteen state
constitutions drafted between 1766 and 1787, many of which
had executive power clauses. For the truly stout of heart, exam‐
ine all the sources in the 690 footnotes that Professor Bradley
and I compiled.26 In those sources you will find no instance of
anyone asserting that any version of an “executive authority
vesting clause” or other general grant of executive power,
without more, also entails general foreign affairs authority—
not one.27 With a minor precursor,28 the first time one sees this
“executive essentialism” argument in any unambiguous fash‐
ion is in Alexander Hamilton’s Pacificus essays, and then only
en route to arguments that rely on more specific textual
grants.29
Nor, countering Professor Ramsey’s own principal sound
byte,30 did Thomas Jefferson adopt the “executive power equals
foreign affairs power” thesis. No doubt, the new Secretary of
State in a memorandum to his immediate superior, the Chief
Executive, stated that “[t]he transaction of business with for‐
eign nations is Executive altogether” and that exceptions “are

25. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976–2005).
26. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9.
27. Or at least none that Professor Bradley and I could find in a fairly careful re‐
view. Given thousands of pages of documents, the possibility always exists that
other examples might be found asserting that a general grant of executive power
entails a general grant of authority over foreign affairs. Our point, however,
would remain that such statements would be rare to the point of being idiosyn‐
cratic when compared to the prevailing practice of reliance on specific texts to
assert discrete powers.
28. The precursor is Rep. Egbert Benson of New York, who served in the first
Congress and opposed any role for the Senate in apportioning diplomatic salaries,
stating that it would be wrong to blend the President and the Senate “in the exer‐
cise of an authority not jointly vested in them by the constitution,” and “in any
business whatever of an executive nature.” 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789–3
MARCH 1791, at 81 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994). Benson’s unusual and unre‐
marked upon statement stands in stark contrast to the norm followed by other
participants in the congressional debate, which was to rely on specific constitu‐
tional texts or powers in arguing on either side of the matter. See Bradley &
Flaherty, supra note 9, at 648–55.
29. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PA‐
PERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969) [hereinafter
Pacificus No. 1]; Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 680–82.
30. Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2006).
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to be construed strictly.”31 Yet, Jefferson’s statement supports
the Vesting Clause Thesis only if it is overread. First, the con‐
text of Jefferson’s reference to the “transaction of business” is
almost certainly a reference to negotiations and other diplo‐
matic communications, given that his memorandum addresses
questions about diplomatic salaries and assignments. Second,
Jefferson quickly unpacks the point by citing the President’s
specific powers in nominating, appointing, and commissioning
diplomatic officers.32 Third, Jefferson’s opinion earlier refers to
all three general grants of power to the three branches in essen‐
tialist terms, which, if taken literally, would also render super‐
fluous the specific grants of legislative powers in Article I, Sec‐
tion 8.33 Fourth, to compound the confusion, this same passage
refers not to executive power, but misquotes Article II to say
powers, which indicates a conception of more specific grants
consistent with his later citations concerning the President’s
control of diplomats.34 Add all this up, include Jefferson’s gen‐
eral tendencies as a constitutional gadfly, and the bottom line is
clear: read this passage from Jefferson’s memorandum cau‐
tiously and avoid making grandiose claims on its behalf.35
A third and final sound byte comes from an amicus brief in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld36 that Jack Rakove, on whom Professor
Ramsey relies,37 sent to me. At the risk of a Woody Allen‐
Marshall McLuhan moment, the Professor Rakove of the brief
does not exactly square with the Rakove portrayed by Profes‐
sor Ramsey. Professor Rakove was joined on the brief by a true
hall of fame roster of constitutional historians on the late eight‐
eenth century. As I flipped through it, I came to a passage on
page twenty:

31. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplo‐
matic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378–
80 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961) [hereinafter Jefferson Opinion]; see also Bradley
& Flaherty, supra note 9, at 654.
32. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 31, at 379.
33. Jefferson begins by asserting that “[t]he Constitution has divided the powers
of the government into three branches, Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, lodg‐
ing each with a distinct magistracy.” Id. at 378–79.
34. According to the Jefferson Opinion, the Constitution declares that the “Ex‐
ecutive powers shall be vested in the President.” Id. at 378 (emphasis added); cf.
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”) (emphasis added).
35. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 654–55.
36. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
37. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 7, at 252 n.87, 271 n.169.
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The Framers did not design the Vesting Clause of Article II as a
plenary grant of unspecified executive powers. Their allocation of
military and diplomatic powers between the branches ex‐
panded upon British practice in limiting executive authority.
Their understandings are reflected in the [C]onvention pro‐
ceedings, in the constitutional texts, and in the debates sur‐
rounding ratification.38

The lack of any sources on point, Jefferson properly read, the
leading experts in the field: each of these supports the proposi‐
tion that the term “executive power” simply did not convey
any notion of general authority over foreign affairs. Together
with the infamous nearly 700 footnotes that Professor Bradley
and I compiled, they also help explain why this conclusion fol‐
lows. At least three sets of reasons undercut assertions of ex‐
ecutive essentialism in general, and the Vesting Clause Thesis
in particular: (1) the contemporary novelty of separation of
powers theory; (2) the corresponding disagreement on the doc‐
trine beyond its general purposes and formalist core; and (3)
the obvious persistence of disagreement on the doctrine, as re‐
vealed by a balanced review of practices in the early republic.
Consider first the relative novelty of the doctrine. A thor‐
ough look at the relevant primary and secondary sources dem‐
onstrates that separation of powers, despite ancient antece‐
dents, remained a relatively new and underdeveloped doctrine
during the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Centuries.
Separation of powers was something political thinkers in the
English‐speaking world, as well as Western Europe, were
working through.
For instance, John Locke had a tripartite system, but his
troika of powers did not include judicial power.39 Rather, it in‐
cluded something he termed the “federative power,” which
was foreign affairs power.40 Yet he did not equate federative
power with executive authority. To the contrary, he specifically
distinguished federative from executive power, and each of
these from their legislative sibling.41 To be sure, Locke did say
that federative and executive authority are “always almost

38. Brief for Jack N. Rakove & Fred Anderson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05‐184) (emphasis
added).
39. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 382–84 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 383–84.
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united.”42 This unity, however, followed not because executive
and foreign affairs authority are essentially the same, but from
the functional reason that federative power “is much less capa‐
ble to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws.”43 To
invoke Professor Rakove once more, Locke believed that the
federative power ordinarily, but not necessarily, should fall to
the executive “on considerations of prudence, convenience, and
efficiency, not right.”44
Montesquieu came far closer to endorsing executive essen‐
tialism than Locke. Yet if he is the best that proponents of the
Vesting Clause Thesis can do, they should not claim victory
just yet. Without delving into all the footnotes, Montesquieu
put forward two classifications, only one of which Professor
Ramsey quotes.45 The one quoted by Professor Ramsey sets out
three classes of power: the legislative, the executive in respect
of the law of nations, and the executive in respect of domestic
civil law.46 No sooner did Montesquieu do this, however, than
he re‐labeled the third form of authority “judicial” and refers to
the second as simply “the executive power of the state,” which
would have the paradoxical effect of leaving out of the defini‐
tion the core meaning on which nearly everyone agrees: to exe‐
cute domestic laws.47 To make matters more confusing, Mon‐
tesquieu’s later references to executive power speak mainly to
law implementation and drop any mention of foreign affairs.48
So much for the clarity of a framework for later generations.
Things only became mixed up with later thinkers. Blackstone
provided executive essentialists with material help because he
wrote primarily in English mixed‐government terms, making
references to separation of powers only in passing.49 That
means his tripartite framework—monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy—consists of governmental archetypes keyed to so‐
cial class rather than governmental functions.50 Aside from
42. Id. at 382–84.
43. Id. at 383–84.
44. Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a
Case Study, in 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 261 (1984). For a more extended analysis, see
Bradley and Flaherty, supra note 9, at 560–61.
45. Ramsey, supra note 30, at 142
46. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent
trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1751).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., id. at 152.
49. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 561–62.
50. See id.
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scattered general references, Blackstone spoke of the king’s
various powers as a function of his prerogative, not executive,
authority.51
Thomas Rutherforth, a lesser‐known thinker on whom Pro‐
fessors Ramsey and Prakash rely, helped further beat a horse
that should by now be well and truly deceased. Stray quota‐
tions of Rutherforth appear to lend support to executive essen‐
tialism.52 Once one starts wading through Rutherforth’s oeuvre,
however, it emerges that he boils the world down to two gov‐
ernment powers: the executive and legislative, with no mention
at all of judicial or federative.53 If one goes a little deeper, it
turns out that Rutherforth believes that such powers as making
peace, making treaties, and making alliances “seem, in their
own nature, to be parts rather of the legislative than the executive
power.”54
My second point follows closely: The relative novelty of
separation of powers doctrine has led to enduring disagree‐
ment over its specifics. Even as Americans came to embrace the
now familiar tripartite version, disagreement prevailed outside
the core meanings of legislative as promulgating laws, execu‐
tive as implementing them, and adjudicative as resolving dis‐
putes within them. Throughout the founding period, dramatic
differences emerged over the nature and placement of specific
powers such as the treaty power, the war power, the removal
power, and the extent of each branch’s control over the mili‐
tary. Such specific differences were most clearly evident in the
fifteen early state constitutions.55 As a threshold matter, the
first of these constitutions mainly created weak executives who
were subordinate to the legislature. Only when experience
showed the problems with such setups did reform toward
more powerful executives result—a development that indicates
that the founding generation cared more about pragmatic
flexibility than essentialist categories.56

51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 30, at 143 n.11.
53. 2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 50–74 (3d ed.,
Whitehall 1799) (1756). Rutherforth saw the judicial power as an “internal or civil
branch of [the] executive power.” Id. at 59.
54. Id. at 64 (emphasis added); see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 565–
66.
55. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 571–78.
56. See id.
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Even within the template of generally weak executives, no
two were precisely alike. To take one example, the states typi‐
cally did make their governors commanders in chief of state mi‐
litias. In some states, however, governors could assume com‐
mand outright. In other states, governors could assume com‐
mand subject to prior approval of an executive council. In other
states, governors could assume command only after the legisla‐
ture signed off. More strikingly, many early state constitutions
vested the appointment of military officers not in the governor
outright, but either subject to legislative approval, or in the legis‐
lature itself, or even in individual militia companies.57
If disagreement prevailed from the bottom up, it also was
evident from the top down. At the Federal Convention alone,
many different laundry lists of executive power appeared.
Early discussion on Madison’s original Virginia Plan stressed
that executive authority should not extend to war and peace,
and still less should track the list of prerogative powers associ‐
ated with the British monarch.58 The New Jersey Plan, largely
the work of William Patterson, proposed an even narrower set
of executive powers: executing federal law, appointing federal
officers not otherwise provided for, and directing military op‐
erations.59 In stark contrast, Hamilton’s near‐royalist plan
would have granted the President the power to execute laws,
to veto bills with no provision for override, to make treaties, to
appoint exclusively certain high federal officers, and to par‐
don.60 Only after all this did the Committee of Detail, under the
leadership of James Wilson, set out yet another, more detailed
list, which not only enumerated executive powers, but also
carefully allocated each of the foreign affairs powers previously
discussed at the Convention among the three branches.61

57. See id. at 581–82.
58. See id. at 592–94.
59. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 244; see also Brad‐
ley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 595–96.
60. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 292; see also Brad‐
ley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 596–97.
61. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 185–86; see also
Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 598–99.
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In none of these, or other, proposals62 and examples63 is there
the slightest indication that the term “executive” stood as a
proxy for some widely understood set of residual powers, still
less a residuum of foreign affairs authority. To the contrary, the
one thing that these and other enumerations had in common
was that, however different, each of these plans sought to de‐
termine which specific powers fell underneath the executive
rubric, rather than presume what the rubric automatically en‐
tailed.
The Framers’ reliance on specific functionalism rather than
general essentialism brings me to point three. Separation of
powers may have been novel, and it may have been underde‐
veloped, but neither observation says much about what the
eighteenth‐century thinkers did think the doctrine entailed. The
answer lies precisely in pragmatic, functional arguments about
where powers would be best placed and exercised, rather than
any sort of global, essentialist deduction.
This functionalist approach goes back to the foundational
theorists, where abstraction might seem the order of the day.
Recall that Locke, for example, first defined the federative
power as entailing certain foreign affairs functions and next
indicated that they should ordinarily be assigned to the execu‐
tive for pragmatic reasons.64 Likewise, aside from a few general
references to executive power, Blackstone not only speaks in
terms of prerogative authority, but also spells out a specific ar‐
ray of functions. In the foreign affairs realm, the short list
commonly includes the powers over peace, war, and treaties.65
The American Framers followed the functional approach to
an even greater extent than the theorists on which they relied.
The Framers simply did not accept the essential argument that
executive authority automatically encompasses any particular
power other than law execution. Rather, they argued about
62. At least one additional plan, with its own distinctive executive, was put
forward by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 24, at 606; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at
597–98.
63. The point about the allocation of specific powers likewise applies to the Ar‐
ticles of Confederation, which assigned specific foreign affairs powers to the na‐
tional government. It is worth noting that, given the absence of a formal execu‐
tive, the Articles at no point classify any of these powers as “executive.” See Brad‐
ley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 585–91.
64. LOCKE, supra note 39, at 383–84.
65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *249
(photo. reprint 1966) (1765).
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where particular powers such as the Declare War Power, the
Treaty Power, or the Receive Ambassadors Power (effectively
the power to recognize foreign governments) should be placed,
given the likely strengths and weaknesses of the legislative,
executive, or even, in certain instances, the judicial branches.66
In the important and comprehensive Virginia ratification de‐
bates, for example, virtually all discussion centered on particu‐
lar clauses and powers: the treaty‐making power above all, but
also the powers to execute laws and to act as commander‐in‐
chief of the armed forces. In stark contrast, references to execu‐
tive power as a general matter were few and far between and,
when they did occur, typically betrayed disagreement about
what the abstract term specifically entailed.67
In looking over the 700 or so footnotes that Professor Bradley
and I compiled, I would say that the ratio is something like
twenty‐five to one between individuals talking about specific
powers in pragmatic terms and the isolated instances in which
they said this power or that power is essentially executive.
Even then, for every type of essentialist argument, one finds
people on the other side saying that there is no grant of power
in the Constitution that is not specifically expressed. In this in‐
formal tally, the weight of the evidence against the essentialist
position is simply overwhelming.
Actual practice in the early republic lends further support to
the foregoing conclusions. Those who argue for some sort of
residual executive authority maintain that nothing else can ac‐
count for the successful assertions of foreign affairs power by
our nation’s first President. George Washington’s supervision
of the Secretary of State, his control of the diplomatic corps,
and his issuance of the Neutrality Proclamation, the argument
continues, are each illegitimate without resort to a founding‐
era consensus that Article II’s apparent grant of executive au‐
thority necessarily entailed control over foreign affairs absent
some textual grant elsewhere.68 For anyone open to seeing it,
the actual course of foreign policy debate in the early republic
suggests precisely the opposite conclusion. The founding gen‐
eration’s efforts to work through the Constitution’s allocations
of foreign affairs powers resulted in a twofold pattern. On one
side, many of the Washington administration’s foreign policy

66. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 592–602.
67. See id. at 604–12.
68. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 7, at 298–311.
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initiatives met with little or no controversy. These initiatives
typically occurred in areas in which the Founders’ views on
separation of powers were well established, agreed upon,
and—not coincidentally—fairly related to specific textual
grants. On the other side are foreign policy initiatives that pro‐
duced substantial debate both inside and outside the admini‐
stration. These instances, not surprisingly, occurred in areas
where there was no clear governing text and no established
founding‐era consensus. Not only did executive essentialism
fail to resolve such debates, the concept, even at this late date,
still rarely appeared.
For good reason, those assertions of foreign affairs authority
that failed to generate controversy strike us today as almost
trivial. They were not seen as much more than trivialities at the
time, precisely because they were plausibly tethered to specific
texts as generally understood in the eighteenth century. The
President ordering the Secretary of State to report to him sim‐
ply does not generate controversy.69 Nor do presidential orders
assigning diplomats to their posts.70 Likewise, even presidential
assertion of power to recognize the legitimate representative of
France prompts no outcry.71 Why not? The answer does not
come from the idea that executive power is foreign affairs
power. Again, the crucial factor was the existence of specific
constitutional clauses that plausibly accounted for the assertion
of executive power. The Opinions Clause72 provides a ready
source of authority for presidential supervision of a cabinet of‐
ficer. Similarly, the Appointments Clause,73 which empowers
the President to nominate diplomats, would seem to entail a
corollary power of assigning those diplomats whom he has
named to specific postings. As for recognition of a foreign state,
the power of receiving ambassadors, granted in the clause

69. The initial basis for Washington’s authority over Jefferson came in the For‐
eign Affairs Act of 1789, which itself delegated to the President specific powers
that tracked discrete foreign affairs grants in the Constitution. See Bradley &
Flaherty, supra note 9, at 642–44.
70. See id. at 645–48.
71. This issue arose with respect to the conduct of “Citizen” Edmond Genet, the
notorious ambassador from revolutionary France. Genet’s outrageous conduct did
provoke significant political debate, but the debate centered on the question
whether President Washington should receive him as France’s legitimate represen‐
tative; little controversy arose over the question whether Washington could do so.
See id. at 664–79.
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
73. Id. cl. 2.
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known by that name,74 was, at least since Blackstone, seen as
the source of that particular authority. It is a strange theory of
constitutional interpretation that would reject reliance on any
of these specific texts as too strained, only to rush to reliance on
the cryptic Executive Vesting Clause to account for any and all
assertions of any and all foreign affairs powers.
Only where specific text clearly runs out—and with it, the
widespread founding‐era agreement necessary to generate
such text—does constitutional controversy boil over. One of the
earliest such examples arose as the first Congress considered
whether it could limit the President’s authority to remove the
proposed Secretary of State. The question produced an epic
debate, which in large part reflected the Constitution’s failure
to address the issue expressly, which in turn reflected a previ‐
ous lack of consideration or agreement on the matter at the
Convention or during ratification.75 Nor have two hundred
years completely clarified the issue, as the Supreme Court has
variously denied and accepted limitations on presidential re‐
moval authority at different times and in different contexts.76
Ordinarily, the first Congress’s various views on removal
would be reason enough to doubt any widespread agreement
on a residual executive authority either in general or as a justi‐
fication for the President’s sole power to remove. Yet, to make
matters worse, debate pro and con proceeded with reference to
specific clauses and policy concerns, not overarching theories
of what executive power either automatically included or did
not include.77
A similar pattern occurs with another epic debate, this time
confined exclusively to foreign relations, which centered on
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793. After thorough
debate within the cabinet, President Washington declared that
the United States would not take sides in the ongoing war be‐

74. Id. § 3.
75. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 656–64.
76. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding for‐cause limita‐
tions on presidential removal of the special prosecutor notwithstanding the tradi‐
tional conception of prosecutors as core executive officials); Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding for‐cause limitations on presidential
removal of heads of independent agencies); Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52
(1926) (invalidating limitations on presidential removal of executive officials). For
a discussion of removal authority in the broader context of the comparative inde‐
terminacy of separation of powers, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1835–36 (1996).
77. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 656–64.
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tween France and the United Kingdom and its allies.78 Contro‐
versy erupted, not only on policy grounds, but also on two le‐
gal issues. First, was United States neutrality consistent with its
treaty commitments to France? Second, and relevant here, did
the President have the authority to declare the nation to be at
peace without congressional authorization?79
Once more, the two sides of the debate primarily relied on
specific clauses rather than essentialist generalities. This reli‐
ance on specific clauses applied even to the greatest exchange
to result from the matter, the Pacificus‐Helvidius debates, which
pitted Alexander Hamilton, arguing in favor of the President’s
power, against James Madison, arguing against executive
power. Make no mistake: Hamilton as Pacificus does clearly
articulate the Vesting Clause Thesis in support of the Presi‐
dent’s action.80 Far from reflecting a general consensus on the
matter, however, Hamilton read in context cuts exactly the
other way for several reasons. First, Hamilton’s articulation of
the Vesting Clause Thesis is the first time, as far as Professor
Bradley and I could tell, that this argument appeared in Ameri‐
can constitutional thought in even a modestly coherent and
sustained fashion. Second, Hamilton himself was among the
most staunchly pro‐executive of all the Founders, and his
views met with opposition from other leading Founders of
similar rank, not least among them Madison and Jefferson.
Third, and perhaps most important, Hamilton’s reliance on the
Vesting Clause is neither extended nor exclusive. To the con‐
trary, no sooner does Hamilton float his general argument
about executive power than he immediately turns to specific
clauses. Among other things, Hamilton argues that the Take
Care Clause empowers the President to interpret and imple‐
ment the nation’s treaty commitments and that the Receive
Ambassadors Clause accords a similar power.81
Madison’s own performance as Helvidius further belies any
consensus on a residual foreign affairs authority, albeit in a
paradoxical manner. In contrast to the prevailing American
approach, Madison himself indulges in essentialist arguments
to argue his case. For Madison, however, the foreign affairs
power of declaring war—and so declaring peace by proclaim‐
ing neutrality—is legislative in nature and thus beyond the
78. Id. at 664–76.
79. Id.
80. Pacificus No. 1, supra note 29, at 39.
81. Id. at 41–43; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 9, at 679–81.

No. 1]

The Most Dangerous Branch Abroad

169

scope of the President’s power.82 Of course, even this argument
is obviously tied to the Declare War Clause in which the Foun‐
ders lodged the war power in Congress rather than following
the British model. In addition, to the extent Madison’s argu‐
ment is essentialist, it repeats a minor theme seen throughout
the founding period—categorical arguments about which dis‐
crete foreign affairs powers were, by their nature, executive or
legislative yielded more disagreement than clarity.
So as a matter of history, executive power essentialism, the
Vesting Clause Thesis, residual foreign affairs authority, or
whatever other name is given to this principle fails to find firm
footing. If one wishes to argue that there is, at most, a modicum
of historical pedigree to this notion, I will accept it, though only
so long as one stresses that “modicum” means a handful of
statements out of thousands. But that is not exactly an original‐
ist argument. To say that a particular position has some histori‐
cal pedigree is far different from demonstrating that it
amounted to the common understanding in the eighteenth cen‐
tury, or that it was so understood by political thinkers or even
by average citizens to any significant degree. If text fails to
support the residual executive power thesis, history dramati‐
cally undercuts it.
III.
Nor, briefly, does structure provide genuine guidance. In
their purest form, arguments based upon the assignment of the
three basic government powers to the three principal govern‐
ment departments are little more than conclusory once one
ventures beyond the cores of the respective powers. Sole re‐
moval authority, for example, does not necessarily follow from
a grant of power to execute the laws. This analytic truism is one
reason why debate on removal authority continues to endure
two centuries after the Founding.83
More promisingly, the structure of separation of powers does
suggest various basic purposes that may offer assistance. Of
these, two basic goals are usually inferred. Allocating different
powers to discrete branches most famously serves the purpose
of preventing the tyrannical accretion of power in any one set of
82. Helvidius No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADI‐
67–69 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985); see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra
note 9, at 683–86.
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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hands. At the same time, separation also addresses the need for
governmental efficiency and energy through specialization.
These structural inferences would be powerful enough in their
own right. As it happens, history confirms that the Founding
generation shared a genuine consensus that separation of pow‐
ers should further these basic purpose; however, much agree‐
ment may have broken down with regard to specific applica‐
tions.84
Approaching questions of foreign affairs authority in light of
these basic structural functions, at worst, yields no consistent
winner among the three branches and, at best, indicates that the
President will not prevail as often as one might suppose. If the
White House’s response to 9/11 shows anything, it is that con‐
cern about accretion of too much power in the Executive Branch
is hardly trivial. Rather, such concerns have been sufficiently
salient that no less than the Rehnquist85 and now the Roberts86
Courts have consistently rejected presidential overreaching.
Conversely, the need to address the specter of terrorism does, at
first glance, suggest the need for the type of “secrecy and dis‐
patch” historically associated with the Executive. Still, it is
hardly clear that vesting extraordinary powers in the Executive
would not give executive officers the incentive to: (1) rush to
conclusions based on little evidence; (2) focus on readily detain‐
able individuals rather than undertaking more difficult and
comprehensive intelligence; and (3) cut legal corners in a way
that diminishes the United States’s standing, and therefore its
effectiveness, abroad. Putting questions about liberty entirely to
one side, another question remains: is national security served
by having an essentially unaccountable Executive?
CONCLUSION
In the end, text, history, and structure do not provide specific
answers so much as they point to a method—and a symmetri‐
cal one at that. For any particular foreign affairs question, one
84. I have set out the historical basis for such a functional approach at length in
The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 76, especially at 1766–71. Along with the
functions of balanced power to prevent tyranny and a desire for efficiency, I fur‐
ther identify what I term “joint accountability,” basically meaning that outside the
core of each power, involvement of the other branches enhances government ac‐
countability to the public. I defer discussion of how this purpose relates to foreign
affairs debates to another time.
85. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
86. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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must first examine the specific textual provisions found in Ar‐
ticles I and II, and elsewhere. If text does not control, then one
should see if history resolves the matter, as is generally ac‐
cepted to be the case with the Declare War Power.87 If that tack
yields no satisfactory answer, then one should seek out ongo‐
ing custom or tradition, much as Justice Jackson advocated.88 If
that does not work, then one should seek an answer in a more
general, purposive approach. Sometimes the answers will cut
in the President’s way, sometimes towards Congress. But noth‐
ing in the text, history, or structure indicates that either the ex‐
ecutive or legislative branch is the presumptive winner in this
case.

87. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare
War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997).
88. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jack‐
son, J., concurring).

